

North Korea and the CTBT

Tuesday 25 June 2019 18:30 (15 minutes)

Conventional wisdom has long held that North Korea would quite likely be the most difficult case among the eight remaining states that must ratify the CTBT for it to enter into force. The recent personal involvement of the Presidents of the U.S., South Korea and North Korea may make this achievement less distant than previously believed. In view of North Korea's stated willingness to give up its nuclear weapons, it would not be logical for it to refuse to join the CTBT and insist on preserving a right to test such weapons. At least signing the CTBT would be a logical and effective early step for North Korea, in what looks to be a long and difficult process to a broader political settlement. This could be accompanied by North Korea's support for, and participation in, the activities of the CTBTO, including verification. Lessons from the negotiation of earlier arms control agreements, as well as from the cessation of the former Soviet Union's nuclear testing program, can help guide the orderly and verifiable transition of North Korea to a Non-Nuclear Weapon State and party to the CTBT.

Primary author: IFFT, Edward Milton (Stanford University)

Presenter: IFFT, Edward Milton (Stanford University)

Session Classification: T5.1 Science in Policy Discussions and Lessons Learned from Other Arms Control Agreements and Arrangements

Track Classification: Theme 5. CTBT in a Global Context